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By 
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(Department of Psychology, Tohoku University, Sendai) 
In this experiment, concept attainment process is considered to be a process which 
is composed of two parts. One is a process of pre-TLE (Trial of Last Error) and the 
other post-TLE. This experiment does not set up a criterion run and the end of 
problems is decided by S. Therefore post-TLE process can be caIled a subjective crite-
rion run (SCR). In this experiment, this SCR is investigated. It is shown that SCR is 
restricted by the number of irrelevant dimensions. In addition to this, an interesting 
fact that the variance of SCR also becomes greater according to the number of irrelevant 
dimensions is found. Processing of positive feedback information and other things are 
discussed. It is suggested that SCR may be restricted both by a limit of the length 
of run of correct responses learned in pre-TLE and by the mimimum number of 
instances necessary to attain a cocept. 
INTRODUCTION 
This experiment is based on hypothesis theory. As Brown (1974) reviewed it a 
few years ago, I will quote a few paragraphs from his paper to show a rough history. 
The use of hypothesis theory as an explanation of conceptual learning behavior has grown 
rapidly in the past few years. As Bourne and Dominowski (1972) pointed out, "It is probably 
fair to say that this has become the predominant theory today, at least for behavior in conceptual 
tasks [po 107]." Modern hypothesis theories have their origins in Bruner, Goodnow, and 
Austin's (1956) thorough analysis of conceptual learning behavior. In this theoretical frame-
work, people were seen as both creating and testing hypotheses on the basis of the information 
provided. 
This view has since been modified to a stimulus-sampling approach (Bower & Trabasso, 
1964; Levine, 1963; Restle, 1962). It differs from the original position mainly in its interpreta-
tion of how the person acquires the hypotheses: Bruner et aI. saw the person a constructing 
hypotheses in an active learning process, whereas more recent conceptions are that all the 
possible hypotheses are already known to the person at the beginning of the experiment, with 
the only task being to select the correct hypothesis from that coIlection. It is this modified 
approach (hypothesis sampling as opposed to hypothesis creation and sampling) that has 
spawned much recent research, and on which this present review is based. 
This study is also based on the modified approach. That is, all the hypotheses are 
already known to S at the beginning of the experiment, and his task is to select the 
correct hypothesis from that collection. 
From a view point of the change of the number of hypotheses (Hs) retained by S, 
concept attainment process can be simply described like the following (see Fig. 1). (a) 
S retains all the hypotheses at the beginning of the experiment. The number of 
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hypotheses becomes less and less, and (b) S comes to be able to make correct 
responses successively after a certain trial. The just recent trial is called a trial of 
the last error (TLE). Especially, a trial at which S has only one H first after TLE 
can usually be called a solution trial (ST). A criterion run is not set up and the last 
trial is arbitrarily decided by S in this experiment. (c) Therefore, in this study, the 
last trial should be called a subjective solution trial (SST). 
In the past, many investigations have mainly studied a process of pre-TLE. To 
investigate the whole process of concept learning, however, more importance must 
be attached to post-TLE process. In order to study a decisional process during post-
TLE, it is necessary not to set up a criterion run. Thus, for problems dealed in this 
experiment no criterion run is set up, and it is confirmed by S's verbal reports whether 
a concept attained is correct or not. In this sense, the run of correct responses from 
TLE to the last trial is called a subjective criterion run (SeR). 
PROBLEM 
Concept attainment is considered as a successive decisional process on information 
sampling. Because the relative weight of the correct hypothesis to the whole is con-
sidered as an important factor in the decision making process, the number of irrelevant 
dimensions is selected as an independent variable in this concept attainment experiment. 
And a dependent variable is SCR. 
Does S process positive feedback information or does S test the hypotheses 
during SCR 1 If this be true and we can assume that the relation among groups as to 
the weight of the correct hypothesis at TLE is the same as at the beginning, SCR must 
be closely restricted by the number of irrelevant dimensions. 
Is there otherwise an absolute limit to S's hypothesis testing behavior or informa-
tion sampling behavior 1 
METHOD 
Design: Four groups were constructed according to the number of irrelevant 
dimensions. Ss in group A had to solve the problems with three irrelevant dimens-
ions, in group B the problems with seven, in group C the problems with fifteen and in 
group D the problems with thirty-one. The number of relevant dimenSIon was one 
in each group, and each dimension had equally two values. As Ss were required to 
attain a simple concept in each group, the number of possible hypotheses was eight 
for group A, sixteen for group B, thirty-two for group C and sixty-four for group D 
(see Table 1). 
Suhjects: The subjects who participated in this experiment totaled seventy-one, 
but seven of them were not able to solve more than three problems of four and dropped 
out. Most subjects were university students in Sendai. In each group, the number of 
Ss was equally sixteen. 
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Fig. 1. Chart of concept attainment process with respect to the change of no. Hs in a very 
simplificated form. 
Groups 
G-A 
G-B 
G-C 
G-D 
Table 1. Ss, no. dimensions, no. values and 
no. Hs in each group. 
I No. Ss I No. Dijensions I No. Values I No. Hs Irrelev. Relev. 
16 3 1 2 8 
16 7 1 2 16 
16 15 1 2 32 
16 31 1 2 64 
Fig. 2. Stimulus used in group A. 
Stimulus: The dimensions and their values constructing stimulus used in each 
group are shown in the following. 
The dimensions and their values used in group A were (1) position (left-right), (2) 
color (white-black,) (3) size (big-small), and (4) letter (T-X) (see Fig. 2). 
In group B they were (1) position (left-right), (2) location (upper-below), (3) color 
(white-black), (4) size (big-small), (5) letter (T-H), (6) number (one-two), (7) background 
(unfigured-oblique line), and (8) frame (broken line-solid line) (see Fig. 3) 
In group C they were (1) position (left-right), (2) location (upper-below), (3) backg-
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Fig. 3. Stimulus used in group B. 
round (unfigured-oblique line), (4) frame (broken line-solid line), (5) numeral (4-7), (6) 
color of numeral (white-black), (7) size of numeral (big-small), (8) number of numeral 
(one-two), (9) katakana (one of the two sorts of Japanese characters) (0-::7), (10) color 
of katakana (white-black), (ll) size of katakana (big-small), (12) number of katakana 
(one-two), (13) alphabet (T-H), (14) color of alphabet (white-black), (15) size of 
alphabet (big-small), (16) number of alphabet (one-two) (see Fig. 4). 
,--------1 
I q I lTd,,] 
: q I 
I d I L _________ ---l 
Fig. 4. Stimulus used in group C. 
In group D they were (1) position (left-right), (2) location (upper-below), (3) 
alphabet (T-H), (4) size of alphabet (big-small), (5) number of alphabet (one-two), (6) 
color of alphabet (white-black), (7) background of alphabet (unfigured-crossing line), (8) 
frame of alphabet (broken line-solid line), (9) Chinese character (*-±), (10) size of 
Chinese character (big-small), (ll) number of Chinese character (one-two), (12) color of 
Chinese character (white-black), (13) background of Chinese character (un:figured-
crossing line), (14) frame of Chinese character (broken line-solid line), (15) numeral 
(4-7), (16) size of numeral (bis-small), (17) number of numeral (one-two), (18) color of 
numeral (white-black), (19) background of numeral (un:figured-crossing line), (20) frame 
of numeral (broken line-solid line), (21) katakana (jJ-::7), (22) size of katakana (big-
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small), (23) number of katakana (one- two), (24) color of katakana (white-black), (25) 
background of katakana (unfigured-crossing line), (26) frame of katakana (broken 
line-solid line), (27) hiragana (the other of the two sorts of Japanese characters) (t -IL.), 
(28) size of hiragana (big-small), (29) number of hiragana (one-two), (30) color of 
hiragana (white-black), (31) background of hiragana (unfigured-crossing line), and (32) 
frame of hiragana (broken line-solid line) (see Fig. 5). 
1'-'-'-'-'-'-[ 
I Cb lli? I 
L._._._._._._._.~ 
I 1JlJ I 
"-'-'-'-'-'-'-'-1 
I ~ ~ I L._._._._._._._._.-.J 
C>IKJ 
Fig. 5. Stimulus used in group D. 
The stimulus used in this experiment had the orthogonality. In principle, it was 
the same as Levine's stimulus (1964). 
An orthogonal layout table is often used in an experimental design. The 
following table, for example, is a 23 orthogonal layout table (see Table 2). Namely, all 
the possible permutations (1-1, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2) appear equal times in every two rows of 
this 4 X 3 matrix consisting of two signs (1, 2). This time it is said that the two rows 
are orthogonal. The factors are laid out in rows and the levels are laid out in signs 
in an experimental design. In case of this experiment, the dimensions of stimulus 
Table 2. Orthogonal layout table (23 type). 
row 
(1) (2) (3) 
(1) 1 1 1 
column (2) 1 2 2 (3) 2 1 2 
(4) 2 2 1 
94 Y. Kanno 
Table 3. Modified layout table. 
row 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1) 1 1 I 1 1 
column (2) 1 1 2 2 (3) 1 2 1 2 (4) 1 2 2 1 
Table 4. Orthogonal layout table used in an actual experiment. 
row 
(1) (2) (3) (5) 
(I) 1 1 1 1 
(2) 1 1 2 2 
(3) 1 2 1 2 
column (4) 1 2 2 1 (5) 2 2 2 2 
(6) 2 2 1 1 
(7) 2 1 2 1 
(8) 2 1 1 2 
are laid out in rows and the values of dimensions are laid out in signs. Thus, dimens-
ions become orthogonal and values of each dimension turn out to be correlated with equal 
times with each other. But this layout table must be modified as in the following 
table in order to be used in an actual stimulus. As the number of dimensions is four in 
case of group A, one more dimension is needed (see Table 3). Although dimensions 
have not any more the orthogonality at the moment, they can recover it again by the 
next modification. That is, the modification is to double the columns and to change 
one value into the other (supplementary) value (see Table 4). In an actual experiment, 
each pair (column number (1)-(5), (2)-(6), (3)-(7), and (4)-(8)) was used as a 
stimuls. The stimuli in group B, group C, and group D were also constructed by the 
same principle. 
Procedure: At the beginning of the experiment, S was given an instruction, and 
then S had to memorize all the possible hypotheses fully. After finishing a rehearsal 
problem, S was given an instruction again. Soon after the instruction, four main 
problems were practiced. The stimulus was exposed to a milky glass embedded in a 
screen by a projector behind it. S's performance was to select either the left figure or 
the right one; a pair of these figures were exposed. E gave a correct-wrong feedback 
information for S's selection. After all, S's performance was to find a critical value or a 
correct hypothesis by which S always could respond correctly. In selecting a figure, S 
was required to select one of which he felt more confident. Exposure time of a stimulus 
was about ten sec. and the time between trials was about five sec. in each group. The 
maximum number of instances possible in a problem was twelve for group A, twentyfour 
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for group B, forty-eight for group C, and ninety-six for group D. Stimulus cards were 
arranged randomly, and cards of the same kind were arranged separately from each 
other. 
Instruction: "Now let us begin the experiment. A pair of figures are projected 
to the milky glass before your eyes. You must select the left figure or the right one. 
E gives a correct-wrong feedback to your selection. Your task is to find a correct 
value. That is, you will be able to select consistently correctly if you respond on the 
basis of it. See table A. All the possible values are described there. Only one of them 
is correct. When you find the correct value, answer it as "The correct value is 'big'." 
In selecting, you must select the side you are more confident of. Have you any 
question? Well, the first is a preliminary problem. After the problem this instruction 
is given again." 
Problems: Ss had to solve five problems in all. But one of them was a preliminary 
problem and was practiced first. In group A the correct hypothesis (value) in each 
problem was 'X' (problem A), 'right' (problem B), 'black' (problem C), 'white' (problem 
D), and 'small' (problem E). In group B it was 'T' (problem A), 'small' (problem B), 
'upper' (problem C), 'broken line' (problem D), and 'two' (problem E). In group C 
it was 'T' (problem A), 'one of numeral' (problem B), '7' (problem C), 'unfigured' (problem 
D), and 'small of katakana' (problem E). In group D it was 'big of katakana' (problem 
A), 'two of Chinese character' (problem B), '*' (problem C), 'crossing line of numeral' 
(problem D), and 'small of alphabet' (problem E). 
RESULTS 
Mean and SD for the number of trials in each group are shown in Table 5 and Fig. 
6. Obviously, the greater the number of irrelevant dimensions becomes, the more 
difficult the performance becomes. SDs in group A and B seem to be almost the same. 
And SDs in group C and D also seem to be almost the same. But SDs in group A and 
Band SDs in group C and D seem to be different. There may be a difference in 
quality between the two. 
Mean 
SD 
Table 5. Mean and SD for the number 
of trials in each group. 
A 
6.74 
1. 57 
B 
10.05 
2.46 
C 
24.74 
8.24 
D 
38.58 
9.77 
Mean and SD for SCR in each group are shown in Table 6 and Fig. 7. Table 7 
shows a result of an analysis of variance of log-translated SCR. And Table 8 shows a 
result of tests on differences between pairs of means by LSD (Least Significant 
Difference) method. These results show that the greater the number of irrelevant 
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Fig. 6. The mean and SD for the number of trials in each group. 
Table 6. Mean and SD for SCR in each group. 
Mean 
SD 
A 
3.29 
1.13 
B 
4.79 
1.85 
C 
7.48 
3.12 
D 
12.02 
4.56 
dimensions becomes, the longer becomes SCR, and that the relationship between the 
number of irrelevant dimensions and SCR is linear. SCR is obviously restricted by the 
number of irrelevant dimensions. 
Paying attention to the change of SD, you will easily find that SD becomes 
bigger and bigger with the increase of the number of irrelevant dimensions. Moreover, 
the change is regular. The change of SD seems to be restricted by the number of irrele-
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Fig. 7. Mean and SD for SCR in each group. 
Table 7. Analysis of variance of log-translated SCR. 
Source of variation df SS MS 
64 
F 
Treatments 
Error 
3 
60 
2.74586 
1. 94467 
0.91529 
0.03241 
28.23995** 
Total 63 4.69053 
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vant dimensions, particularly by the minimum number of instances necessary to solve a 
problem. See Fig. 8. 
DISCUSSION 
The obtained results are discussed here with respect to the varIOUS assumptions 
made by hypothesis theorists. 
The most basic three assumptions which are (1) prior knowledge of hypothesis 
pool, (2) hypothesis as unit of behavior, and (3) response generation, are considered to 
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Fig. 8. Comparison between SCR and the minimum number of instances necessary to attain 
a concept (M-inst.). 
Table 8. Tests on differences between pairs 
of means for SCR. 
G-B 
0.147* 
G-C 
0.341** 
0.194** 
G-D 
0.551** 
0.404** 
0.210** 
G-A 
G-B 
G-C 
Table 9. Comparison between the longest run in pre-TLE 
(L-run) and SCR. 
L-run SCR L-run 
B--4, 1 1 4 D-l,l 6 > 
2 3 > 1 2 2 > 
3 1 = 1 3 2 
4 2 > 1 4 5 
5 3 > 2 5 4 
C-5,1 3 5 
2 2 = 2 
3 3 = 3 
4 3 -
5 4 6 
SCR 
5 
5 
5 
-
8 
involve all the theoretical positions (Brown, 1974). These basic assumptions are 
accepted also in this experiment in principle. The assumption of prior knowledge of 
hypothesis pool was represented in S's memorizing all the possible hypotheses at the 
beginning of the experiment. But Ss seemed not to be aware of all the possible 
hypotheses during the course of the experiment. This was suggested by S's reports. 
The second assumption, hypothesis as unit of behavior, was confirmed in this experi-
ment. See Table 9. In the table, SOR and the longest run of correct responses in 
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pre-TLE are compared. It is three Ss data, but three Ss are enough. 'B-4-1 , in the 
table shows the 1st problem of the 4th subject in group B. It is found that the longest 
run of correct responses in pre-TLE is longer than SCR or the same as SCR in some 
problems. D-1-1, for example, shows that D-1 made six correct responses successively 
and made an incorrect response in the next trial. This is an evidence that hypotheses, 
and not choice responses alone, are the unit of behavior. If choice responses alone were 
the unit of behavior, SCR should not be shorter than the longst run in pre-TLE. 
The third assumption, response generation, was not confirmed in this experiment. 
This assumption means that the S responds on the basis of a single hypothesis. To 
confirm this assumption, it is needed to show the absence of majority rule. This 
experiment, however, was not set up to confirm it originally. As Levine (1970) 
showed that of all the inconsistent blank-trial patterns (7.6%), 38.3% could be accounted 
for in terms of majority-rule behavior, perhaps in this experiment majorityrule behavior 
must have existed. Thus, although this assumption has some difficulties, it is 
still valid. 
SCR was a run of correct responses, namely, S was given only positive feedback 
information during SCR. Here we must discuss Ss' hypothesis behavior after positive 
feedback. 
First I will show several evidences found in the past as to positive feedback. 
In general, there are two types of feedback. One is positive and the other is 
negative, and there are two types of hypothesis behavior corresponding to them. That 
is, they are a win-stay assumption and a loss-shift assumption. A win-stay and lose-
shift assumption is that S maintains the same hypothesis if his overt response is 
correct and that S shifts to another if it is incorrect. 
There are two positions as to a win-stay assumption. One is that win-stay does 
not occur before the first error trial (Kenoyer, 1972; Kenoyer & Phillips, 1968). The 
other is that S immediately selects a hypothesis to respond with (Levine, 1966). In 
general, S seems to select and to maintain hypotheses prior to the first error. The fact 
that a correct answer was given even after errorless trials in this experiment supports 
the latter position. For example, B-13 could give a correct answer, after he had 
responded successively correctly during the first nine trials in his third problem. In 
addition, 0-9 could also give a correct answer after he had made correct responses 
successively during the first nine trials in his first problem. Thus, win-stay assumption 
is supported. But many invstigations have reported the existence of win-shift 
behavior (Levine, 1966, 1971; Nahinsky, 1968; Nahinsky & Slaymaker, 1969, Wells, 
1972; Erickson, 1968; Coltheart, 1973). Therefore, win-stay assumption in its strong 
form may not be supported. 
It is a problem whether Ss process any information after positive feedback. There 
are also two positions as to this problem. It has been suggested that Ss process 
information and eliminate alternative hypotheses even when Ss maintain a single hypo-
thesis through a series of correct trials (Nahinsky, 1968; Nahinsky and Slaymker, 1969). 
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Millward and Spoehr (1973) and Levine (1966) also seem to support the position. 
and Trabasso (1964), however, have taken the opposite position that Ss 
maintain the same hypothesis after a correct and does nothing else. 
Bower 
simply 
If positive feedback information is processed, SOR is decided at the time when 
S eliminates all the hypotheses except the most confident one. SOR in each group 
has seemed almost the same as the minimum number of instances necessary to attain 
a concept in each group (see Fig. 8). This might mean that positive feedback 
information is processed. But it may be also true that SOR is not decided by only the 
minimum number of instances. Ss' verbal reports have suggested that SOR is 
decided not only by the minimum number of instances but also by the length of run 
of correct responses in pre-TLE. Therefore, it is proper to consider that the two 
factors restricted SOR together. More detailed experiments, however, will be needed 
to conclude this accurately. 
It has, however, become clear at least that more importance must be attached to 
the post-TLE process. 
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